Abstract: Featuring no key escrow and no certificate, certificateless public key cryptography (CLPKC) has received much attention. A necessary problem in CLPKC is how to revoke a compromised/misbehaving user, which still remains to be efficiently solved: all existing methods are not practical for use owing to either enormous computation (secret channels), or a costly mediator. In this paper, we present a new approach for revocation in CLPKC and give a revocable certificateless encryption (RCLE) scheme. In the new scheme, a user's private key contains three parts: an initial partial private key, a time key and a secret value. The time key is updated at every time period and is transmitted over a public channel. Our construction offers higher performance than previous solutions. Based on the bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem, our RCLE scheme is provably secure in the random oracle model.
1 Introduction management are quite complex and costly. Shamir (1984) invented a new public key system called 'identity-based cryptography' (IBC). Since then, a large number of identity-based cryptographic schemes have emerged (Wang et al., 2015; Luo, 2015; Ma, 2014) . In IBC, a user's unique identity is the right public key, hence removing the need for certificate. A user's private key is fully generated by a private key generator (PKG), which results in a key escrow problem. To solve this inherent problem in IBC, Al-Riyami and Paterson (2003) presented 'certificateless public key cryptography' (CLPKC). In CLPKC, a user's private key is partially generated by the key generation centre (KGC) and the user's public key does not require a certificate to declare its authenticity.
Any public key cryptosystem faces a practical problem that each user should be revoked as soon as the corresponding private key is compromised (e.g., the contract is expired; the user is dismissed; the private key is leaked). To solve this revocation problem, there have been many methods proposed, such as certificate revocation list (CRL), online certificate status protocol (OCSP) (Myers et al., 1999) , Novomodo (Micali, 2002) and SEM ). In the identity-based cryptosystem, Boneh and Franklin (2001) suggested a method that the PKG generates private keys for all non-revoked users periodically. Libert and Quisquater (2003) applied the SEM architecture to the Boneh-Franklin identity-based encryption (IBE) to obtain instantaneous revocation. Boldyreva et al. (2008) utilised a binary tree to present a scalable revocable identity-based encryption scheme, which was later improved by Libert and Vergnaud (2009) . Tseng and Tasi (2012) proposed an efficient revocable IBE scheme without using secret channels (to update keys) or a costly third party. They employed the BLS short signature to produce a public time key for a user. The time key is necessary for ciphertext decryption. The revocation is achieved by stopping the generation of a time key for the revoked user. Very recently, Seo and Emura (2013) gave a method to make revocable identity-based encryption to resist decryption key exposure.
In CLPKC, how to obtain efficient revocation mechanisms is also a critical issue. The conventional solution (Al-Riyami, 2004; Chow et al., 2006) is to generate new partial private keys periodically for all non-revoked users. KGC revokes a user by stoping the production of new partial private keys. Since all the transmissions are over secret channels, both the KGC and the users have to do enormous computation. The other technique is to employ an online third party called security mediator (SEM) (Chow et al., 2006; Ju et al., 2005; Yap et al., 2007) . A user's partial private key is divided into two secret pieces, one of which is delivered to the user while the other is sent to the SEM. Every user needs the help of the SEM to do decryption and signing. Revocation is achieved by informing the SEM not to issue necessary tokens for the user. This kind of revocation mechanism is not popular in some situations since every user cannot do decryption and signing independently. Moreover, the SEM has to keep large amount of private pieces which is risky. Shen et al. (2014) presented a certificateless encryption with revocation. However, their scheme suffered from some security weakness and costly computation and bandwidth. Very recently, we presented the first scalable RCLE scheme in the standard model.
Our contributions:
In this paper, we propose a new approach to achieve revocation in CLPKC and construct a revocable certificateless encryption (RCLE) scheme in the random oracle model. In our approach, a user's private key is composed of three parts: an initial partial private key, a secret value and a time key. The initial partial private key and the secret value are kept by user as usual. The time key is updated by KGC at every time period and is transmitted over a public channel. When the KGC has to revoke a user, it just stops refreshing time keys for that user. Without a time key, anyone is unable to perform decryption. Our RCLE scheme offers higher performance than previous solutions, hence is more applicable in practice. The definition and the security model of a RCLE scheme are given for our purpose. Based on the bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem, the given scheme is proved secure in the random oracle model.
Definitions

Revocable certificateless encryption
In this section, we define the framework of a RCLE scheme. It is slightly different from the definition of a conventional certificateless encryption scheme in a sense that the private key is composed of one more part called time key. The following eight algorithms define a RCLE scheme:
• Setup: With a security parameter k as input, this algorithm outputs a list of public system parameters params as well as a master key mk.
• Extract-Initial-Partial-Private-Key: With params, mk and an identity ID as input, this algorithm creates an initial partial private key D ID . D ID is transmitted over a secret channel.
• Update-Time-Key: With params, mk, an identity ID and a time period t as input, this algorithm computes a time key D IDt . D IDt is transmitted over a public channel.
• Set-Secret-Value: With params and ID as input, this algorithm outputs a secret value s ID .
• Set-Private-Key: With params, D ID , D IDt and s ID as input, this algorithm sets a private key SK IDt .
• Set-Public-Key: With params and s ID as input, this algorithm sets a public key P K ID .
• Encrypt: With params, P K ID , ID, t and a message M as input, this algorithm produces a ciphertext C.
• Decrypt: With params, SK IDt and C as input, this algorithm decrypts C to recover a message M . Note that M can be a special symbol ⊥ indicating decryption failure. 
Security model
Game I (for a Type I adversary)
• Setup: The challenger runs Setup to generate a list of public system parameters params and a master key which is kept secret.
• Phase 1: In this phase, A I can make various queries as follows. 3 Secret Value query: When receiving such a query from A I , the challenger returns a secret value by running Set-Secret-Value.
4 Public Key request: For a public key request made by A I , the challenger responds with a public key by running Set-Public-Key.
Public Key replacement:
A I can replace any public key with a new one. The current public key is used in any coming computation or response.
6 Decryption query: A I can make a decryption query on a combination of (C, ID, t). The challenger decrypts C under the private key associated with the current public key.
• Challenge phase: After Phase 1, A I outputs the challenge identity and time (ID * , t * ) as well as two equal-length messages (M 0 , M 1 ). Note that ID * has not been queried to the initial partial private key oracle at any time. The challenger picks β ∈ {0, 1} at random and creates a ciphertext C * of M β as the target, under the current public key P K ID * .
• Phase 2: A I continues to make queries as in Phase 1.
Note that ID * should not be queried for the initial partial private key at any time and any decryption query on C * for the combination of (ID * , t * ) is not allowed.
• Guess: A I outputs a guess β ′ ∈ {0, 1}.
Game II (for a Type II adversary)
• Setup: The challenger runs Setup to generate a master key mk and a list of public system parameters params. Both mk and params are given to A II .
• 3 Decryption query: : A II makes a decryption query on a combination of (C, ID, t) The challenger responds with the decryption of C by running the Decrypt algorithm.
• Challenge phase: After Phase 1, A II outputs an identity ID * and a time t * as well as two equal-length messages (M 0 , M 1 ). Note that the secret value of ID * should never be queried. The challenger randomly picks β ∈ {0, 1} and creates a challenge ciphertext C * of M β .
• Phase 2: A II makes more queries as in Phase 1. Any decryption query for the combination of C * and (ID * , t * ) is not allowed.
• Guess: A II outputs a guess β ′ ∈ {0, 1} for β.
Game III (for a revoked user)
• Setup: The challenger runs Setup to generate a list of public system parameters params and a master secret key mk. It gives params to the adversary A re .
• Phase 1: In this phase, A re can make various queries described below: • Challenge phase: After Phase 1, A re outputs an identity and a time (ID * , t * ) as well as two equal-length messages (M 0 , M 1 ). Note that the time key of (ID * , t * ) should never be queried. The challenger picks β ∈ {0, 1} at random and creates a ciphertext C * of M β as the target.
• Phase 2: A re makes more queries as in Phase 1, except the time key query on (ID * , t * ) and the decryption query on (C * , ID * , t * ).
• Guess: A re outputs a guess β ′ ∈ {0, 1} for β.
The adversary's advantage in the above games is defined as Adv(
A RCLE scheme is said to be ciphertext indistinguishable against chosen ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA secure) if no PPT adversary has non-negligible advantage in the above three games.
Difficult problem
This section introduces some basic notions that are needed in the construction and the security analysis for our scheme. Bilinear Pairing. G 1 is an additive cyclic group with a generator P . G 2 is a multiplicative cyclic group. Both are of prime order p. A bilinear pairing is a map e : G 1 × G 1 → G 2 with the following properties:
2 non-degeneracy: e(P, P ) ̸ = 1 G2 3 computability: for any Q, W ∈ G 1 , e(Q, W ) can be computed efficiently.
Below are two computational problems defined in the bilinear group (G 1 , G 2 , p, P, e).
• Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem. 
Concrete scheme
This section gives the concrete construction of our RCLE scheme. The security is proved under the security model proposed above.
The construction
Our RCLE scheme is as follows.
• Setup: G 1 and G 2 are two bilinear groups as described above. e : G 1 × G 1 −→ G 2 is a bilinear pairing, and P is a generator of G 1 . Pick a random s ∈ Z * p and compute P 0 = sP . There exist five hash functions: (ID, t) , then transmits D IDt to the user over a public channel.
• Set-Secret-Value: This algorithm randomly chooses x ID ∈ Z * p as the secret value.
• Set-Private-Key: For a user with identity ID at the time period t, the full private key is
• Set-Public-Key: For a user with identity ID and secret value x ID , this algorithm computes P K ID = x ID P as the public key.
• Encrypt: Providing a message M , a time period t, a receiver's identity ID and public key P K ID , this algorithm does the following:
1 choose a σ ∈ {0, 1} l randomly and compute
• Decrypt: Providing a ciphertext C = (U, V, W ) and the receiver's private key (D ID + D IDt , x ID ), this algorithm perform the following steps:
2 check whether the equation H 3 (σ, M )P = U holds 3 if yes, recover and output the plaintext by computing M = W ⊕ H 5 (σ); otherwise, output a failure symbol ⊥.
Security proof
We analyse the security through the following three theorems. 
• else, B chooses h 1i ∈ Z * p at random, computes
• add the corresponding tuple to the list. Decryption queries: When receiving a decryption query on (C, ID, t),
* and the public key of ID remains unchanged, B runs the decrypt algorithm to recover the plaintext.
• if ID = ID * or the public key of ID has been replaced, B decrypts in the following way: a search the H 3 , H 5 and H 4 lists for tuples (σ, M, h 3 ), (σ, h 5 ) and (E ′ , F ′ , h 4 ), which satisfy: As to the simulation of decryption oracle, let DecErr denote the event that B rejects a valid ciphertext during the simulation. B will wrongly reject a valid ciphertext during the simulation with probability smaller than q D /q 3 . Namely,
It is clear that if E does not happen during the simulation, B will not gain any advantage greater than 1/2 to guess β, due to the randomness of the output of
By definition of ϵ, we have
The probability that B does not abort during the simulation is at least 1 q2 . Hence, It is not difficult for us to get the following
Hence we obtain the advantage for B to solve the CDH problem
The running time of B is t
where T S and T p denote the time for doing scalar multiplication and pairing, respectively. Theorem 2: Suppose H i (i = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5) are random oracles and there exists a Type II IND-CCA adversary A II against the RCLE scheme with advantage ϵ when running in time t, making q pk public key queries, q D signature queries, and q i random oracle queries to H i (1 i 5).
Then, there exists an algorithm B to solve the CDH problem with advantage ϵ (ID i , x i ) . On receiving such a query on an identity ID i , B searches the list: if there has been a corresponding tuple, return the secret value; otherwise, do the following:
• if i = I, abort the game
p as the secret value, and add (ID i , x i ) to the list.
Public Key queries: B maintains a secret value list of tuples (ID i , P K i ). On receiving such a query of an identity ID i , B acts as follows:
• if i ̸ = I, B searches the secret value list for an x i and computes P K i = x i P . If there is not a matched secret value with ID i , B chooses x i ∈ Z * p and computes P K i = x i P . Add (ID i , x i ) to the secret value list and (ID i , P K i ) to the public key list.
Decryption queries: When receiving a decryption query on (ID, t, C), If ID ̸ = ID I , B runs the decryption algorithm normally to recover the plaintext; else, B performs the following steps:
• Search the H 3 , H 5 and H 4 lists for tuples (σ, M, h 3 ), (σ, h 5 ) and (E ′ , F ′ , h 4 ), which satisfy:
• If such tuples exist, return M as the answer to the query.
• Otherwise, B just return a symbol ⊥ to indicate an invalid ciphertext. Analysis. The analysis of this theorem is similar to that of theorem 1. We omit the details and can obtain the advantage of
The running time of B is t ) and the running time of B is t
, where T S and T p denote the time for doing scalar multiplication and pairing, respectively. 
Efficiency analysis
In our RCLE scheme, a user's time key is independent of its initial partial private keys. It is updated at every time period, and what's attracting is that all time keys are transmitted over public channels. To show the efficiency, we make a comparison of computational cost, ciphertext length and revocation-type of our scheme with that of a trivial revocable CLE scheme [it employs the most efficient standard-assumption-based CLE scheme (Cheng and Comley, 2005) ; a user's partial private key D IDt = sH 1 (ID, t) is updated by KGC at every time period and is transmitted via a secret channel].
In Table 1 , 'Enc' denotes encrypt, 'Dec' is decrypt, 'cipher-len' is short for ciphertext length and 'cha' represents channel for key updating. The popular and practical revocation method for non-certificate public key system is to update keys periodically for every user. Secret channel (sec for short, and pub for short public channel) indicates that both the KGC and a user have to do enormous computation for the establishment of secret channels. From the comparison, we can see that our RCLE scheme is more efficient than the existing certificateless revocation solutions. 
Conclusions
In this paper, we propose an efficient approach to achieve revocation in certificateless setting and construct a RCLE scheme in the random oracle model. In contrast to the existing revocation solutions, our technique features public channels for key-updating, avoiding the use of secret channels or a costly mediator. The new scheme is very efficient thus is more applicable in resource-limited environments. We first formally define the framework and the security model for a revocable certificateless encryption scheme. Our RCLE scheme is proved IND-CCA secure in the random oracle model based on the BDH problem.
